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of general interest, culminating in a swingeing dismissal of the pretensions of a 'socialist case' for tropical Africa. But his analysis is undermined by a seeming disinterest in defining or taking seriously the real dilemma of development common to all African states, or the relationship of a socialist strategy to them. To Berg we shall also return-by way of a brief conclusion.
The purpose of this article is limited, as, at the present stage of the debate, we can merely hope to raise some neglected questions, juxtaposing them with the theory and praxis of African 'socialists'. The fuller elaboration of a socialist strategy, on the other hand, can only emerge at a more advanced stage of debate and research. In section I we examine the relationship between current class formation in tropical Africa and economic development, focusing on the involvement of international capitalism in the area and on the emergence of what we shall define as the 'labour aristocracy' of tropical Africa. In section II we shall look, first, at the ideology of'African socialism' and, secondly, at the policies of African 'socialists', subjecting both theory and praxis to careful critique. From this exercise the reader should gain a broader perspective on the problem of socialism in contemporary Africa; we shall conclude with some brief remarks on the future course of socialist debate and strategy in Africa, making some reference to the Tanzanian experience (section III).
I. CLASS FORMATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The vast majority of the population of tropical Africa consists of independent producers who do not depend upon wage employment for their subsistence.' Any discussion of economic development in tropical Africa must therefore begin with a general description of African precapitalist or, as they are more often referred to, traditional economies. This is extremely difficult, in view of their heterogeneity;2 but some common features of particular relevance to our discussion can be singled out. Individuals can customarily acquire land for homestead and farms through tribal or kinship rights. Only comparatively rarely is land 1 K. C. Doctor and H. Gallis estimate that the proportion of the labour force of tropical Africa in wage employment is, on average, I I I per cent. However, migrant labour, characterised by partial dependence upon wage employment for its subsistence, is included in the estimate, so that the proletariat proper accounts for a lower percentage than the above. 
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AND JOHN S. SAUL acquired or disposed of through purchase or sale, though the commercialisation of agriculture has often been followed by a marked expansion of private land ownership. The specialisation of labour has generally not gone very far in traditional African economies; a relatively small range of commodities is produced and few full-time specialists are to be found. In addition, the technology is rather rudimentary from the point of view of the tools used, storage and transport facilities, the control of plant and animal disease, and the control of water storage. Market exchanges were-and still are in many areas-peripheral, in the sense that most producers do not rely on exchange for the acquisition of the bulk of the means of subsistence. Thus the high dependence on the physical environment, due to the rudimentary technology, is matched by a relative independence from market fluctuations. Social cohesion is fostered by obligatory gift-and counter-gift-giving between persons who stand in some socially defined relationships to one another, and/or by obligatory payments or labour services to some socially organised centre which re-allocates portions of what it receives. Security of subsistence is therefore generally guaranteed to the individual in two ways: through socially structured rights to receive factors of production and through emergency allotments of food from the chief and gifts from kin.
It is widely accepted that African peasants have, in general, been highly responsive to the market opportunities that have arisen through contact with European capitalism. This responsiveness has manifested itself in the labour migration system and/or in the rapid expansion of production for the market of both subsistence and cash crops. It seems that this responsiveness was made possible by the existence in traditional African economies of considerable surplus productive capacity in the form of both surplus land and surplus labour-time.l This means that the confrontation of a traditional economy producing a limited range of goods with the sophisticated consumption pattern of an advanced industrial system led to a re-allocation of labour-time from unproductive traditional activities to the production of a marketable surplus.2 It has been pointed out, however, that the increase in peasant production for the market has had the character of a 'once and for all' change (though distributed over a number of years), as witnessed by the characteristic growth curve of such production; a curve, that is, rising 2 The adjective 'unproductive' has, of course, no negative implication concerning the rationality or the necessity within the traditional society of activities so characterised.
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steeply in the early phase and tapering off gradually.' This phenomenon can be accounted for by the fact that the social structure of the traditional economies favours, by maximising security, the adoption of a short 'time horizon' in the allocation of whatever surplus might have been produced as between consumption, unproductive accumulation, and productive accumulation.2 In other words, peasants still largely involved in a pre-capitalist mode of production are likely to have a strong preference for present consumption and often for unproductive accumulation, which, by maintaining or strengthening social cohesion, preserves the security afforded by the traditional system. This preference is likely to be strengthened by the confrontation of the peasants with the sophisticated consumption pattern of advanced industrial systems mentioned in the previous paragraph. It would seem, therefore, that we have two problems involved in promoting the growth of productivity of the African peasantry: (a) the problem of creating incentives to exploit whatever surplus productive capacity in the form of surplus land and surplus labour-time may exist; and (b) the problem of raising the productive absorption of the surplus produced in the traditional sector in order to engender the steady growth of the productivity of labour. The first problem concerns the relationship between the modern and the traditional sectors; that is, it concerns the pattern of surplus absorption in the former which is likely to maximise the incentives to increase productivity in the latter. The second problem, on the other hand, relates to the type of organisation of production and institutions in the traditional sector which is likely to guarantee the desired responses to the stimuli transmitted by the modern sector. In tropical Africa the first problem seems of primary importance because population pressure on the land, though growing, is generally not yet severe, so that most traditional economies still have some surplus productive capacity. For this reason we shall focus our attention on the development potential of the pattern of surplus absorption in the modern sector. The 'ideal type', in Max Weber's sense, of surplus absorption in the modern sectors of present-day tropical African economies is characterised by three main forms of surplus absorption: the export of profits 1Cf. Myint, op. cit. and Walker, op. cit. 2 We define 'surplus' as the difference between the aggregate net output produced (net, that is, of the means of production used up in the process) and the means of subsistence consumed by the community, both referred to a given period of time. By 'subsistence' we understand goods that are socially recognised as necessities, so and investment income in general; discretionary consumption on the part of a small labour aristocracy, as defined below; and productive investment, embodying capital-intensive techniques, mainly concentrated in sectors other than those producing capital goods.1 In order to understand the relationship between these three forms of surplus absorption, it is convenient to begin by examining the causes and implications of the sectoral distribution and factor-intensity of productive investment. The use of capital-intensive techniques of production in tropical Africa is not only the result of technological factors. Two other factors seem equally relevant: the investment policies of the modern international corporations in under-developed economies and the wage and salary policies of the independent African governments, which, in turn, depend upon the character of their power base. With regard to the former, the modern international corporations tend to adopt capitalintensive techniques mainly because of managerial constraints and because of their strong financial position.
Techniques of management, organisation, and control have evolved in the technological environment of the industrial centres and cannot be easily adapted to the conditions obtaining in under-developed countries. In consequence, the spectrum of techniques taken into consideration by the corporations may not include labour-intensive techniques. An equally and probably more important factor seems, however, to be the financial strength of these corporations, which they acquire through their pricing and dividend policies in the industrial centres as well as the periphery.2 The international corporations apply to all their branches technical methods corresponding to their capital;3 as a result, capital-intensive techniques are adopted in tropical Africa irrespective of the situation in the territories where the investment takes place.
But capital-intensity of production is also favoured by the salary and wage policies of the independent African governments. 
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salaries attached to the posts.1 This unquestioning acceptance of a colonial salary structure brought about a huge gap between the incomes of the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment and the mass of the wage workers. Thus the whole level of labour incomes, from the unskilled labourer upwards, came into question and, given the political influence of urban workers on African governments, the major employers of labour, a steady rise in wages ensued. This steady rise is also favoured by, and tends to strengthen, the capital-intensive bias of investment, discussed above. Capital-intensity generally means that labour is a lower proportion of costs, so that the individual concern is more willing to concede wage increases (especially foreign oligopolies which can pass on cost increases to the consumer). However, this reinforces the tendency towards capital-intensive (or labour-saving) growth and a 'spiral process' may ensue.2
With regard to the sectoral distribution of productive investment, besides obvious technological factors (economies of scale, advantages of operating in an industrial environment, etc.) there seem to be three main reasons for the observed under-investment in the capital-goods industries of tropical Africa. In the first place, the very bias in favour of capital-intensive techniques discussed above tends to promote the use of highly specialised machinery and consequently restrains the growth of demand for capital goods that could be produced locally. Other reasons relate more directly to the behaviour of the modern international corporations. In non-industrialised economies the market for capital goods is small; for such goods to be produced there must be good reasons to believe that the whole economy will develop in such a way as to nourish a market for capital goods.3
This fact was no serious obstacle in the nineteenth century, when competitive entrepreneurs and financial groups often undertook investment which was 'unjustified' by market conditions, thereby fostering the industrialisation of less developed economies. Nowadays the great calculating rationality, care, and circumspection in approaching new developments which characterise modern corporations prevent that process from taking place. As Sweezy has remarked, it is one of the many contradictions of capitalism that better knowledge may impair its functioning. Finally, the lack of investment in the sector producing capital goods is also determined by the oligopolistic structure of advanced capitalist countries because this implies that producers of capital ARRIGHI AND JOHN S. SAUL goods, in deciding whether to establish, or to assist in establishing, a capital-goods industry, will generally take into account the effect of the decision not only on their own and their competitors' export interests but also on those of their customers. The lack of development of the capital-goods sector has important implications for the growth of the modern sector. For such a development, when it does occur, can perform the dual function of expanding both the productive capacity of the economy and the internal market. This latter function, too often disregarded, was emphasised by Lenin, who argued that the development of the internal market was possible despite restricted consumption by the masses (or the lack of an external outlet for capitalist production) because 'to expand production it is first of all necessary to enlarge that department of social production which manufactures means of production, it is necessary to draw into it workers who create a demand for articles of consumption. Hence " consumption" develops after "accumulation".'l Thus under-investment in the capital-goods sector restrains the expansion not only of the productive capacity of tropical Africa but also of its internal market, perpetuating the dependence of the economy on the growth of world demand for its primary products. It is not surprising, therefore, that the economies of tropical Africa have been unable to grow faster than their exports. In the period I950-65 real product seems in fact to have grown at an average compound rate of 4-2 per cent per annum,2 which is about I per cent lower than the rate of export growth.
Given the high rate of population growth, per capita real product has increased at an average rate of 2 per cent per annum in the same period. This relatively low rate of growth, combined with the effects of the 'wage-mechanisation' spiral discussed above, has resulted in a decrease in the proportion of the labour force in wage employment in most countries and has been accompanied by a widening gap between urban and rural incomes.3 It is far from correct, however, to assume that all classes in the urban areas have benefited from this widening gap. A large proportion of urban workers in Africa notoriously consists of semi-proletarianised peasants, periodically engaged in wage employment. This migrant labour force is not 'stabilised' and in general does not acquire that specialisation needed in industrial enterprises which use capital-intensive techniques. These labourers as a class, i.e. as peasants temporarily in wage employment, cannot gain from the 'wage- As a consequence the creation of stimuli to increase productivity in the rural areas is left to the sluggish expansion of foreign demand for African produce and to those 'invocations to effort' which are a prominent feature of much 'socialist' practice in Africa and to which we shall return.
The slow growth of peasant incomes and productivity has in turn a negative impact on the growth potential of the modern sector itself, since it further hampers the expansion of the internal market. It would seem, therefore, that an acceleration of economic growth in tropical Africa within the existing political-economic framework is highly unlikely and, as the phase of easy import substitution is superseded, a slow-down may actually be expected. In the light of these considerations, the current economic growth of tropical Africa may be properly characterised as 'perverse growth'; that is, growth which undermines, rather than enhances, the potentialities of the economy for long-term growth.l In describing theoretically the current pattern of growth in Africa we have argued in terms of an 'ideal type', as we were bound to in an essay of this sort. The full range of historical cases will undoubtedly include exceptions which do not fit our conclusions. Yet it is interesting to note that even the Ivory Coast, model of the international capitalist road to development, is beginning to feel the pinch which accompanies IN AFRICA I5I that strategy; several authors have recently commented on the country's pattern of growth 'without development', without genuine self-sustaining transformation, which looks increasingly tenuous for the long run as profits begin increasingly to flow back to France and few reinforcing complementarities emerge. Indigenous sources of capital and 'entrepreneurial' ability (public or private), which might push in a more fruitful direction, are stifled by the emergent class structure and pattern of international involvement.' The foregoing discussion suggests the advisability of a policy of selfreliance vis-a-vis international capitalism for two main reasons: (a) because of the drain on the surplus which, sooner or later, is engendered by dependence on foreign capital; and (b) because of the impact of foreign investment (with respect to choice of techniques and to its sectoral distribution) upon the structure of the tropical African economies.2 It does not follow, however, that the disengagement from international capitalism is a sufficient condition for development. As we have seen, the emergence of a labour aristocracy, with considerable political power, was brought about not only by the pattern of foreign investment but also by the acceptance of a colonial salary structure on the part of independent African governments. The labour aristocracy will therefore continue to use its power in a state-controlled modern sector in order to appropriate a considerable share of the surplus in the form of increasing discretionary consumption. Under these conditions 'perverse growth' would continue notwithstanding state ownership of the means of production.3 In order to achieve 'real' long-term development, disengagement from international capitalism will have to be accompanied by a change in the power base of African governments.
Yet even the re-allocation of surplus from the discretionary consumption of the 'labour aristocracy' to productive investment, though a necessary condition, is not sufficient for steady long-term growth. Productive investment in the modern sector must be directed towards the creation of development stimuli in the traditional sector; that is, it 2 It is surprising that apologists of foreign private investment in Africa (who consider the drain on the surplus a payment for technical assistance and finance supplied by the international corporations) have seldom paused to consider whether the managerial, administrative, and technical skills supplied are suited to the requirements of the receiving economies from the standpoint of their growth potential (as opposed to some short-term effects on income and employment). Certainly a process of very real differentiation is afoot in many parts of rural Africa. The commercialisation of peasant agriculture has often been followed by a marked expansion of private land ownership,2 and a growing division between the nascent agricultural 'entrepreneurs' (the 'kulaks', as Professor Dumont recently referred to them in Tanzania), the more marginal cash croppers, the subsistence farmers, and the agricultural labourers. Increasingly these strata have differential interests with implications for rural strategy. Thus, for example, cooperatives may come to be manipulated by the more economically advanced peasants for their own benefit. If the instruments of'generalised mobilisation' become mortgaged to one particular group, the thrust of such a development policy may well be blunted.
On the other hand, it has been ably argued that at this stage in development it may be wise to 'let the kulaks run', to allow the logic of the market to briser la famille (as Samir Amin has put it), and to 
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one example, Senghor is sometimes alive in his writings to the dangers of a newly privileged, urban-based group of' intellectuals-liberal professionals, functionaries, employers, even workers'-arising to exploit 'the peasants, shepherds and artisans'. But the point is not pushed nor possible institutional checks hypothesised; rather, he relies largely upon 'spiritual values' to avert the danger. Yet excessive self-denial on the part of this 'labour aristocracy '(as we have defined it) is certainly not to be expected when so militant a socialist spokesman as Toure himselfcan note: In our denunciation of bourgeois tendencies we must not, as do specialists in confusion, accuse of being bourgeois the peasant, the worker or the civil servant who is a convinced democrat and devoted P.D.G. member and who by his personal efforts has been able to build a modern house, purchase a car or acquire honestly anything which contributes to the material well-being of his family. Since the main objective of our revolution is to make it possible for all to attain through work the highest possible degree of prosperity, we cannot blame these people. On the contrary, a man must utilize his energies and faculties for the constant improvement of his living standard. Occasionally certain steps are taken and presented with a logic that seems impeccably to combine the twin concerns of development and equality. Thus an argument postulated upon the social necessity of capital accumulation and the imperative of 'hard work' is often used when African governments turn to deal with the trade unions. In most 'socialist' countries the latter have been brought to heel, absorbed organisationally into the network of the ruling party. It is argued that they represent a privileged cadre of workers and that their gains are being made at the expense of the country as a whole, of the rural sector in particular. As a step towards general development, they must be disciplined accordingly and redirected from 'consumptionist' to 'productionist' activities.3 ARRIGHI AND JOHN S. SAUL Another prime target is the trading community, and again the argument against it is often advanced in terms of the need for both a more egalitarian pattern of distribution and accelerated capital accumulation. The redistribution of excessive profits of local traders and (sometimes) foreign trading houses is demanded, to provide incentive payments for the growers and more finance for productive investment by the state. In addition it is argued that the marketing co-operatives which are further encouraged by such steps in the rural areas represent a collective, and therefore socialist, enterprise which is laudable in its own right. The fact that the trading group to be so displaced is often largely composed of a racial or cultural minority may, of course, ease the acceptance of such policies.
One might be better disposed to accept these latter moves on the terms in which they have been presented by the leaders, were the general line of argument which is used to justify them (that is, the criticism, by presumptive socialists, of inequalities which block development) more consciously and rigorously applied to the society as a whole.
Unfortunately this has not been the case: perceived inequalities-what Toure has termed 'contradictions'-get
very easily swallowed up and blurred analytically within the framework provided by the continent's distinctive 'socialist' ideology. Here we refer to that strand of the argument which has been characterised by Peter Worsley as 'populism'.l In Africa this has involved the claim, by almost all leaders, that African societies are, even now, classless. The foundations for pervasive social solidarity are to be found in traditional society and, mediated by a contemporary 'attitude of mind', continue to strike against meaningful stratification.
The most outspoken statement of this 'model' is to be found in Nyerere's early paper 'Ujamaa',2 but even so Marxist-tinged a spokesman as Toure has fallen back upon the 'communocratic' nature of African society to smooth over, ideologically, certain of the potential class antagonisms he sees in Guinean society. To this Toure adds the argument that such classless uniformity is reinforced by the fact of the whole population's facing, as a body, the neo-colonialist exploiter. Not surprisingly, nationalism provides much of the cement for this populist edifice, being useful also for displacing continuing ethnic or tribal consciousness. Countless quotations could be introduced to demonstrate these general emphases in Africa. Nor, within such a 'classless' society, is it surprising that any consideration as to the nature of the social relations of production is seen to be of little fundamental concern to socialist aspirations. Thus Kofi Baako, a man as close as anyone to Nkrumah in Ghana:
In a Nkrumahist-Socialist state, the farmer will not lose his farm; the landlord will not lose his house, but will not be allowed to exploit the tenant; the employer will not be allowed to exploit the worker, nor will the worker be allowed to cheat the employer by idling about; the car owner will still have his car .. the property or wealth which someone has acquired or earned through hard labour and through honest use of his mental and physical energies [will not] be taken away from him and shared among lazy, unscrupulous, indisciplined but able-bodied citizens.
As Fitch and Oppenheimer observe of such utterances: 'Neither landlords nor capitalists will be abolished-they will simply be regulated.'1 This 'populist' strain to African socialism also has important implications for the analysis of the rural sector; moreover, there it is perhaps even more likely to be taken seriously by the ideologues themselves.
Worsley summarises this theme when he writes: 'Africa is its peasantry, subsistence producers and cash-crop producers, but independent peasants. This is the basic fact about the social structures of the new African states.' We have already seen this to be suspect, given the character of'town-country' relationships in contemporary Africa, but within the rural area itself solidarity is (once again) felt to arise from these facts. Yet, as we have suggested, even the relatively unrevolutionised rural economies of tropical Africa are no longer as undifferentiated as these African leaders like to profess. What is clear, therefore, is that the issue of nascent rural class formation and its implications for development cannot be squarely faced, or effective 'long-run' strategies of socialist control and direction developed, within a populist framekwor of analysis which masks the process of rural change.
Even in the absence of such a searching examination of rural realities, it none the less remains true that the 'mobilisation' of the peasantry is regarded as a vital necessity much more vocally in states of'socialist' bent than in others. There, a more generalised release of productive energies is looked to; it is in this context that the strand of 'African Socialism' which Friedland had termed 'the social obligation to work' becomes most prominent.2 Socialism is presented as an invocation to Side-effects tend to drop out of the equation. The application of a long time-horizon might suggest that, despite a time lag, the inflow of unfettered foreign capital must eventually lead to a marked drain of repatriated profits and the like. Therefore an assessment must constantly be made as to its genuine development potential; as suggested, many forms of capital import may be worse than none at all, despite the subsequent existence of plant on the ground and a handful of newly hired indigenous employees. One can, of course, suspect that some of the encouragement given to an increased capital inflow may arise from the elite's concern with short-term balance-of-payments difficulties caused by excessive imports. None the less, for the genuine African socialist, the necessity of internal capitalformation must be underscored in his arguments and, furthermore, explained clearly to the people. For, all too often, the promise of a favourable deal to be made by the elite with that most powerful external constellation of technology and economic power which is the western economic system smacks of an attempt to get something for nothing (an unlikely occurrence, but perhaps a useful political case to make to the mass of the population in the short run). Given a clearer perspective, the definition of firmer conditions for such capital as did come in would also become a more pressing imperative than has been the case, however difficult such conditions are to apply in practice. And a vigorous attack upon 'balkanisation' and an advocacy of regional groupings, preferably of 'like-minded' states, to encourage complementarities and co-ordinated development would become an even more prominent feature.
The relating of an ideology like African socialism to the complex social structure of changing Africa and the identifying of its functions is not an easy task. We have said enough, however, to suggest that more than mere intellectual confusion is at issue. It is true that in colonial and economically under-developed Africa an indigenous dominant class with power grounded in the process of production had, by and large, not emerged;l the political and bureaucratic groups which did come forward to prominence were therefore defined by a greater 'relative social autonomy and plasticity', as Roger Murray has put it.2 None the less, after independence, when a combination of past education and/or political record and current bureaucratic position came to be the chief determinants of privilege in the new society, it is clear that, in the absence of more rigorous organisation and ideological clarity, a rather narrow vested interest in the system had come to characterise the new elites, 'une bourgeoisie plus proche d'un mandarinat', as Dia has called them. Their growing consciousness of a differentiated position vis-a-vis the mass of the population was such that Lloyd, one of the shrewdest ARRIGHI AND JOHN S. SAUL observers of this process, could toy with the idea of discarding the ' lite' concept and substituting the notion of 'class' to describe the position in society of this group.1 Thus it is within this sort of context that one must place trends-to an increased centralisation of power, the absorption of quasi-autonomous bodies, and ideological myth-making for popular consumption of the sort we have examined-which are then seen to express a clear institutional and, behind that, a class interest.2 And within this framework much state intervention, in so far as it seems only marginally related to a generalised socialist development strategy, can in part be explained as the conscious proliferation of jobs for incoming recruits to the dominant group. At the very least, given the nature of the bureaucratic elite, any glib identification, by leaders or observers, of socialism in Africa with itatisme and policies for centralisation of economic control must be viewed with suspicion. In addition, a sustained stand against the blandishments of foreign capitalism, or even a critical scrutiny of its potential contributions, is unlikely from such a group. There is some danger of crude reductionism in such a generalised formulation, but it remains a hypothesis which illuminates a great deal of the empirical evidence at our disposal.
A closer examination of the practice of African states conventionally labelled 'socialist' contributes markedly to such a picture. Thus Samir Amin's valuable study of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali demonstrates, with telling statistical force, the heavy weight of bureaucratic expense and conspicuous urban consumption, both public and private, in the budgets of these states. His conclusion is: 'L'austerite, l'effort revolutionnaire de mise en point de methodes nouvelles moins cofteuses n'ont pas resiste aux appetits 
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there is a gross discrepancy between the amounts spent abroad for importation of drink and other luxury items (toiletries, certain kinds of motor cars) and the amounts of foreign exchange used for capital formation.1 Similar statistics to document the importance of what we have termed 'discretionary consumption' could be produced for other countries on the continent. Amin (and others) stress the importance of this pattern for the traditional sector which in the absence of a genuine take-off he sees as still the major brake upon development efforts within the three national experiments he reviews. Certainly it becomes increasingly difficult under these circumstances for a rural population to take at face value the protestations and demands for sacrifice of such an elite. And, as should by now be evident, vital resources which could stimulate the dynamic interaction of the urban and rural sectors are being diverted from that effort. In the Ghana of the early I96os a reasonably sophisticated style of socialist debate which began in certain Ghanaian student circles abroad in the I940S was revitalised;2 this was characterised, for example, by 'the attempt to transcend the "African Socialism" current of thought in favour of a more universal and scientific theory; and the related effort to institutionalise and accelerate the formation of an ideological vanguard of cadres who might then strive to make ideology a mass force (Winneba) ' Of course, where wage restraint began to be demanded of these junior partners to the 'aristocracy' its imposition was made more difficult by the unambiguously privileged position of its other members, the politicians and the salariat: 'Essentially the C.P.P. solved the problem of moral versus material incentives by denying both: the workers were ordered to become Stakkanovites to defend a revolution that had never really begun.'3 Even the character of the take-over of the trading sector, attempted in one form or another in most African 'socialist' states, is revealing. It certainly promises a proliferation of jobs; it also provides sources of advantage for a leadership cadre whose highest level of consciousness is often enrichissez-vous. Once again, the norm of redistribution is shown to be ambiguous. The Abraham Commission's inquiry into corruptions in Ghana's trading corporations makes chilling reading; extended peculation has all too often characterised the substitution of a network of co-operatives and marketing boards elsewhere. Certainly any total take-over of the marketing system is sufficiently difficult to make one hesitate to see it as an early priority for a socialist strategy, especially in the light of our earlier discussion of the ambiguities involved in establishing socialist priorities for the rural areas.
But it is important to note that criticisms such as those by Berg and others concerning Guinea's sweeping 'nationalisation' of the marketing sector may oversimplify the case; it is not only administrative incapacity that is at stake.1 Much of the failure had to do with the character of the Guinean elite and the norms of the bureaucratic machine that moved to assert control. A more generalised socialist strategy, establishing, for example, different priorities in training cadres and attempting to raise the socialist consciousness of the people concerned through political education, might possibly transcend some of these problems. 
I64
prominence show the strength of forces driving the situation in a counterrevolutionary direction.1 As noted in the introduction, it has not been our intention to articulate fully a forward strategy for African socialism. None the less, there are themes here which demand the urgent attention of all those concerned.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Tanzania is, perhaps, the country in contemporary Africa where socialist aspirations figure most prominently and interestingly in the development equation, and most powerfully affect the kind of policies which are being pursued. To be sure, much remains to be done there; moreover, it is by no means clear that all the relevant dimensions of the problem of socialist development have as yet been considered by the leadership. Another article of this length, in fact, could be written to discuss the implications of the Tanzanian experience to date and its likely trajectory. But perhaps a few brief points can be made here in the light of the preceding discussion.
It remains true that much of the course of recent Tanzanian development has been charted by the evolution of President Nyerere's own thinking, from the rather simpliste 'African Socialist' themes of presumptive solidarity and an automatically socialist 'attitude of mind', which are to be found in the paper on Ujamaa cited above,2 to a more subtle assessment of African realities; by and large it has not arisen from any concerted group or mass pressure. But the relatively unchallenged acceptance of certain accompanying party policies and, especially, the attainment of widespread ideological conformity to novel socialist aspirations do testify, in some measure, to the 'relative social autonomy and plasticity' of the African leadership cadre which was suggested above. Whether the emergent labour aristocracy in Tanzania can really transcend the narrow horizons of its opposite numbers in other African countries remains to be seen. But a genuine attempt is being made to elicit a heightened socialist commitment from them (and, among other things, a consequent curb on the 'politics of urban consumptionism'). Of course, the lack of 'revolutionary intellectuals' among the leaders is a striking feature, suggesting a possible future drag upon the policy of Yet presumably much will also depend upon parallel efforts, using the democratic mechanisms peculiar to Tanzania's one-party system as well as other institutions, both to rouse the vast mass of the peasant population to express their interests as a social force checking possible abuses of their position by the leaders, and at the same time to raise the level of mass consciousness so that such 'intervention' is of a progressive sort. The fact that, given a relatively unmobilised peasantry, this will be a difficult balance to strike should require no elaborate emphasis. It also appears true that the Tanzanian party, T.A.N.U., which might otherwise seem the ideal instrument for linking revolutionary intellectuals and the mass of the population, remains a relatively weak reed.1 It is, unfortunately, too early to assess the likelihood of a dramatic change in this dimension of the Tanzanian situation, but the efforts undertaken to realise such a change may be one of the features making Tanzania an important focus of interest in the next few years.
For the fact remains that the President has increasingly displayed a sophisticated awareness of many of the patterns of African change which we have discussed; the importance of the 'rural-urban' dichotomy, the relative lack of socialist direction provided by a mere 'attitude of mind', some of the ambiguities of foreign economic involvement in the domestic economy, and the realities of rural stratification. Regarding the first of these, his actions have been forthright: witness the curbing of student pretensions at the University College, the subsequent civil-service salary cuts, the recent disciplining of the extravagant wage demands of N.U.T.A. (the national trade union), and, most important of all, the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, which has enacted a self-denying ordinance against certain kinds of economic aggrandisement by the elite (especially as regards the ownership of property) and thus called upon them to exemplify their socialist commitment.2 A real beginning has thus been made. Similarly, 'political education' has become a much more dominant theme, both within the educational system and vis-a-vis the general public, suggesting that there is increasingly an ideology and a commitment to be taught and to be understood, and a higher level of socialist consciousness to be worked towards, rather than merely to be assumed, as the basic building block of Tanzanian socialism.
A wide range of firms has been nationalised, including banks, insurance, and some processing and manufacturing concerns, with some by curbing discretionary consumption in the urban areas. An attendant result is that, hinged upon the constantly reiterated slogan of'SelfReliance', mere agricultural expansionism, a rather dangerous strategy when world prices are falling, tends to be substituted for agricultural expansion to meet a planned, industrially induced demand, both direct and indirect. In fact it is perhaps fair to say that 'industrial growth' is still a missing link in the chain of socialist strategy in Tanzania; there is a relative silence on the priority to be given to industrialisation, on how capital formation should be divided between the capital-goods sector and the consumer-goods sector or, again, between the sectors servicing the rural areas and those servicing the urban areas, or how agricultural policy should be expected to fit into this pattern. The related question 1 As one example, such leaders are to be subject to severe restrictions in their hiring of labour, a practice which would involve, in the language of Arusha, 'exploitation'.
2 Julius K. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development (Dar es Salaam, I967). Whether this particular aspiration is premature is, as we have noted, a moot point. The President himself does not fully explore the links between agricultural development and an 'egalitarian' mode of production beyond remarking that 'if this kind of capitalist development takes place widely over the country, we may get a good statistical increase in the national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people will not necessarily be better off. On the contrary, as land becomes more scarce we will find ourselves with a farmers' class and a labourers' class, with the latter being unable to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to the total output.'
